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Abstract: 
Analyses of the rising capacity for coordination within the Secretariats-General of the 
European Commission and Council have concentrated on their effects within these 
respective institutions. This article, in contrast, argues that the presence/absence of 
coordination capacities developed within an institution may have an important bearing 
also on the relations between institutions (e.g., in inter-institutional negotiations). The 
empirical analysis traces the negotiation process leading up to the creation of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), and finds substantial support for the 
theoretical argument. 
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I. Introduction 
Following the Kinnock reform of 2000-01, the European Commission’s Secretariat-
General underwent important structural and procedural changes that increased its 
coordinating and monitoring roles (Kassim, 2006, 2010). In parallel, the Council’s 
Secretariat-General adopted several ‘co-ordination mechanisms and modalities’ 
(Christiansen and Vanhoonacker, 2008: 762; Christiansen, 2002) such as the ‘dorsale’ 
unit that coordinates information provision to the Member States (Farrell and Héritier, 
2004). While the underlying idea in both cases was to ‘avoid duplication, redundancy 
and policy incoherence’ (Kassim, 2010: 25; Christiansen, 2002), recent analyses 
illustrate how these coordination units also ‘improve the possibilities (…) to assert 
political influence’ within their respective institutions (Dijkstra, 2010: 528; Christiansen, 
2002; Beach, 2004; Christiansen and Vanhoonacker, 2008; Kassim, 2010). This literature 
strongly supports theoretical arguments that coordination is central to shaping 
institutions’ capacities in the struggle for power (e.g., Panebianco, 1988; Moe and 
Wilson, 1994). 
 
Rather than concentrating on intra-institutional dynamics, this article analyses the role 
of internal coordination in interactions between different institutions: i.e., to what 
extent, and through which mechanisms, does internal coordination affect inter-
institutional interactions? This shift in focus from intra- to inter-institutional dynamics 
addresses the idea, recently raised by Farrell and Héritier (2004: 1210), that different 
modes of internal coordination might have important implications ‘for the bargaining 
strength of these organizations in inter-organizational relations’. Interestingly, during 
the Kinnock-reform negotiations, a similar idea was explored also in the European 
Commission, as ‘better internal management [was] intended to contribute to better 
management of external relations’ (Metcalfe, 2000: 821, emphasis added). Nevertheless, 
to the best of my knowledge, no academic studies thus far explore this possibility. 
 
In this article, I address this question by tracing the process establishing the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which obtained formal approval in July 2010.1 There are 
three reasons underlying this choice: first, all major EU institutions (i.e., European 
Commission (EC), Council2, and European Parliament (EP)) were involved in the EEAS’ 
establishment, and the technical details of its construction were subject to intense 
negotiations between these institutions. Second, unlike Inter-Institutional Agreements 
(IIAs), which are concluded increasingly frequently between EP, Commission and 
Council for everyday legislative planning and procedures (Kietz et al., 2005; Alemann, 
2006), the EEAS involved a major institutional reform. Its analysis thus allows extending 
                                                        
1
  The EEAS represents part of the new institutional framework conceived in the Treaty of Lisbon to reform 
EU’s foreign policy governance. It was created to assume the foreign policy tasks currently undertaken 
separately by the Commission (i.e., external, economic relations of the Community pillar – such as aid, 
development and trade) and the Council (i.e., common foreign and security policy [CFSP] – such as military 
and civilian crisis management). 
2
  Importantly, within the framework of the EEAS negotiations, the Council’s two main bodies – the Secretariat 
General (CSG) and the Member States/COREPER – negotiated separately, rather than jointly.  
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previous work to this particular institutional dynamic. Finally, the European institutions 
involved in the EEAS negotiations vary in the extent and nature of their internal 
coordination, which provides crucial variation for my empirical analysis: i.e., while the 
capacity for internal coordination is hierarchical and formalised within both the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat (see above), it is predominantly horizontal and 
informal among Member States (Tallberg, 2003; Hartlapp, 2011), and largely absent in 
the European Parliament (Farrell and Héritier, 2004) (more details below). 
 
The results – based on both textual evidence and interviews with key players in the 
EEAS negotiation process – indicate that an institution’s internal coordination can have 
an important influence also in inter-institutional negotiations. Two mechanisms 
underlying such external effects of internal coordination are highlighted: a) familiarity 
with brokering agreements and shaping the agenda within an institution provides 
valuable experience also for inter-institutional settings, and b) members of institutions’ 
coordination units are ideally placed to act as institutional entrepreneurs in inter-
institutional negotiations, allowing them to ‘doctor’ information streams (Crozier and 
Friedberg, 1980), forge alliances (Hartlapp, 2011) and leverage support for shared 
interests or aims. I also show that, in the EEAS negotiations, hierarchical coordination 
structures (as in the Commission and the Council Secretariat-General) appeared more 
powerful than informal, horizontal ones (as those between Member States). These 
results not only provide a new building block for understanding institutional 
development and reform (e.g., Pierre and Peters, 2009; Stephenson, 2010), but also 
indicate that more attention may be due to inter-institutional interactions – rather than 
intra-institutional dynamics – in research on EU policy-making.  
 
In the next section, I present the analytical framework underpinning my analysis. Then, 
in section III, I describe the EEAS negotiations, data collection, and my empirical 
findings. Finally, Section IV reviews the main results and discusses their implications for 
future work.  
 
II.  Analytical Framework 
Inter-institutional negotiations can be viewed as a two-step process: a) Each 
institution’s desired outcome results from intra-institutional negotiations reflecting 
power-games among its key actors, while b) these various desired outcomes are the 
subject of a similar negotiation process between the involved institutions (Panebianco, 
1988; Moe, 2005; Costello and Thomson, 2011). This reflects the idea that in inter-
institutional negotiations ‘a very large part of the work (…) involves negotiators 
negotiating with their own side, to reconcile internal differences, clarify objectives and 
priorities’ (Metcalfe, 1994: 277; Mayer, 1992).3 At both stages – i.e., negotiations within 
                                                        
3
 This view likewise shares similarities with Putnam’s (1988) contribution on two-level games. However, 
Putnam (1988) assumes that intra-institutional negotiations ‘are handled by a chief negotiator’, thus ‘avoiding 
the difficulties of intra-institutional co-ordination’ (Metcalfe, 1994: 277).  
 5 
and between institutions – coordination capacities developed within an institution can 
play a critical role. 
 
With respect to intra-institutional negotiations, their role has already been extensively 
discussed (see introduction). The argumentation builds on Moe and Wilson’s (1994) 
claim that players’ capacities for exercising power are a function of their ‘bureaucratic 
structure’. More specifically, a rising capacity for coordination, as well as a more pro-
active coordination strategy, increases players’ ability to act as gate-keepers through 
positive and negative ‘agenda-shaping’ powers (Tallberg, 2003: 5; Christiansen, 2002; 
Tallberg, 2008; Princen, 2009; Dijkstra, 2010; Kassim, 2010). Positive agenda-shaping 
thereby refers to the opportunity to bring new suggestions to the negotiation table or 
emphasise certain issues already there, while negative agenda-shaping denotes the 
ability to de-emphasise issues or keep them off the table altogether (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962; Tallberg, 2003; Moe, 2005). More broadly, such agenda-shaping powers 
can also be exercised through ‘choosing who participates’ in the negotiations (Hartlapp, 
2011: 191) and active involvement in (co-)producing paperwork relevant to the 
negotiating parties (Beach, 2004; Hamlet, 2005). As a result, coordination becomes a 
critical tool ‘to exercise power over others’ (Moe, 2005: 221; Panebianco, 1988).  
 
Why would internal coordination capacities matter also in inter-institutional settings? 
First, the above-mentioned argumentation is unlikely to hold only within a given 
institution. Rather, familiarity with brokering agreements and shaping the agenda 
within an institution provides experience – and creates a reputation for having such 
experience – that is valuable in brokering agreements and shaping the agenda in inter-
institutional settings (Beach, 2004).  
 
Second, in the institutional entrepreneurship literature (for an overview, see Batillana et 
al., 2009) specific organisational actors are identified as ‘relais actors’ (Crozier and 
Friedberg, 1980: 82), ‘boundary personnel’ (Panebianco, 1988: 205) or ‘boundary 
spanners’ (Rothenberg, 2007: 750). These enjoy ‘privileged relations with the different 
parts of [their] environment’ (Panebianco, 1988: 205), gain access to more 
comprehensive information (i.e., develop a ‘helicopter view’; Trondal, 2010) and ‘control 
the flow of information’ within and between institutions (Farrell and Héritier, 2004: 
1188; Crozier and Friedberg, 1980). As such, they are placed ideally to take a central 
role in modifying existing institutions, or developing new ones (Pierre and Peters, 
2009). As the main task of institutions’ coordination structures lies in ‘ensuring the 
coherence of the [institution’s] work’ (Hamlet, 2005: 16; Christiansen, 2002), individuals 
working in a coordinating capacity are especially likely to become ‘relais actors’. 
Moreover, the development of coordination capacities in various institutions represents 
a commonality across these institutions along the principle of major process utilised 
(Gulick, 1937). Such ‘experience of working within a common bureaucratic culture’ has 
been shown to generate ‘an ideational structure [that] facilitates the cooperation’ 
(Christiansen, 2001: 765). Consequently, coordination structures may play a central role 
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in attempts to work together and form alliances (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Dorado, 2005; 
Hartlapp, 2011).4 
 
Coordination capacities in different institutions can vary in form and extent, ranging 
from formalised structures of hierarchical coordination (Bouckaert et al., 2003) to 
informal structures of lateral coordination based on ‘collaborative networks and 
informal contacts’ (Broman, 2008: 23; Jönsson and Strömvik, 2005). In the European 
Commission and Council Secretariat-General, for instance, internal coordination has a 
high degree of hierarchical formalisation (see section I above). Among the Member 
States, however, coordination is ‘formally anchored’ in the rotating presidency and the 
COREPER5 meetings, but typically operates based on ‘informal institutional practices’ 
(Tallberg, 2003: 5). This diverse nature of coordination likely affects its influence on 
(intra- as well as) inter-institutional dynamics.  
 While formalised hierarchical structures may generate important benefits by clarifying 
roles, rules and procedures, they are not necessarily synonymous with internal 
coherence. In the Commission’s formal inter-service consultation, for example, all DGs 
used to have their say with the result that the Commission’s negotiation position 
became a weak compromise and its negotiators could not credibly ‘claim to be 
constrained by their parent chamber’ (Costello and Thomson, 2011: 337). 
 Informal structures can often be very efficient (Stone, 2011) because negotiators may 
compensate a lack of formal resources by being more committed (Habeeb, 1988) and 
exploit such higher ‘preference intensity’ (Tallberg, 2008: 692) through reliance on 
more demanding negotiation techniques (e.g., procedural tactics, careful preparation 
and arbitration). Moreover, under the critical condition of mutual trust, ‘the existence 
of [informal] cooperative network structures will facilitate forms of positive and 
negative self-coordination that are quite similar to those produced within hierarchical 
organizations’ (Scharpf, 1994: 49). The Council Secretariat under Javier Solana, for 
example, was full of informal networks, which made it a dynamic, successful 
organization (Christiansen, 2002; Dijkstra, 2010). Still, informal, lateral coordination 
tends to require more effort from the actors involved than its hierarchical counterpart 
(Mayer, 1992), can be ‘quite vulnerable to high rates of turnover’ (Chisholm, 1989: 
142) and requires continued dedication and commitment of those involved (Habeeb, 
1988; Kaczynski, 2011).  
Overall, it is an empirical question whether ‘hierarchical’ or ‘lateral’ internal 
coordination is better for one’s outlook in inter-institutional negotiations.  
 
III: Empirical Analysis 
III.1: Case selection and data 
                                                        
4  Internal coordination structures may not be the only reason why alliances between institutions develop. 
The empirical analysis accounts for alternative reasons for alliance formation. 
5  COREPER stands for Permanent Representatives Committee. It ‘consists of the Member States’ 
ambassadors to the European Union’ and is ‘chaired by the Member State which holds the Council 
Presidency’ (cited from http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/coreper_en.htm).  
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The European External Action Service (EEAS) is at the heart of the new institutional 
framework of EU’s foreign policy. Created to assist HR/VP Baroness Ashton in her 
mandate as EU’s ‘foreign policy chief’ (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 27.3)6, the EEAS is to 
assume the foreign policy tasks currently undertaken separately by the Commission and 
the Council (see also note 1). However, the Treaty remains silent on how to bring this 
about structurally. It simply delegates organisation of the EEAS to a process of multi-
institutional negotiations involving all those with an interest in the service: i.e., 
European Commission (EC), Council Secretariat-General (CSG), Member States (MS) and 
European Parliament (EP). As these key actors are characterised by spatial variation in 
their coordination capacities (more details below), but no temporal variation (i.e., the 
extent of coordination within the various institutions remained constant over the April 
2009–July 2010 period analysed), the EEAS negotiations present an ideal opportunity to 
empirically investigate the whether and how inter-institutional negotiations are affected 
by intra-institutional coordination capacities. 
 
It is important to note that while the birth of EEAS goes back to the ‘Convention on the 
Future of Europe’ (December 2001–July 2003), the present analysis restricts attention 
to the negotiation process that started during the ratification process of the Treaty of 
Lisbon (i.e., April 2009–July 2010). Admittedly, some preparatory meetings and 
negotiation attempts took place already in 2005, but the negative outcomes of the 
French and Dutch Constitutional Treaty referenda halted these efforts quickly and they 
‘produced very little indeed’ (Missiroli, 2010: 4). Consequently, ‘very little systematic 
preparation had been undertaken in the years preceding ratification (…) [and] serious 
preparation therefore only started during Sweden’s Presidency’ (Christoffersen, 2010, 1; 
Interviews 11, 14, 25, 26), which substantiates taking this presidency as the starting 
point of the present analysis. 
 
The empirical analysis combines information from two data sources. First, I employ 
official documents related to the EEAS negotiations. These include, but are not limited 
to, the ‘Swedish Presidency Report’ (October 2009), the ‘Blueprint for the EEAS’ (March 
2010), the Brok-Verhofstadt ‘non-paper’ and ‘Working Document’ on EEAS (March and 
April 2010, respectively), ‘Parliamentary Updates’ from EP standing Committees 
involved with EEAS (October 2009-July 2010), the annotated quadrilogue draft (June 
2010), annotations to the Council’s draft decision (July 2010), the final Formal 
Agreement (July 2010), transcripts of speeches made by HR/VP Baroness Ashton, 
minutes to Commission meetings (esp. 1909th meeting on 11 March 2010), the “Non-
paper on the European External Action Service from the Foreign Ministers” of 12 
Member States (December 2011), and so on. Second, to obtain direct insights into the 
negotiation process, I conducted, recorded and transcribed 26 semi-structured face-to-
face interviews with key actors in the negotiations (referred to as Interviews 1-26 below 
to maintain confidentiality), and obtained access to fourteen further interviews 
                                                        
6
  HR/VP stands for High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Vice-President 
of the Commission.  
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conducted on 7 and 14 July 2010 by the Sub-Committee C of the EU and Foreign Affairs 
Committee, and on 19 January 2010 and 14 June 2011 by the Select Committee on the 
European Union, both at the UK House of Lords. Direct citations from these 40 
interviews are italicised below. 
 
Regarding the interview-data, two issues are worth highlighting. First, given the nature 
of the trialogue/quadrilogue system within which the EEAS negotiations took place (i.e., 
informal or semi-formal meetings without official minute-taking; Farrell and Héritier, 
2004) and the fact that the EEAS was approved when most interviews took place, there 
is no need for interviewees to ‘hide’ opinions previously defended (though 
‘misremembering’ may of course be a problem, see below). Second, my interview list 
included top-level officials directly involved in the EEAS negotiations from all involved 
institutions, supplemented with representatives from the staff unions and both Special 
Advisers to HR/VP Baroness Ashton on EEAS. While anonymity was requested by all my 
respondents, non-response proved to be a minor concern (although I was sometimes 
referred to the EEAS adviser of my targeted respondent). In the end, interviews were 
conducted with one Special Adviser to the HR/VP, one union representative charged 
with the EEAS dossier, (the EEAS advisers of) four MEPs (including two Rapporteurs on 
EEAS), seven representatives of Member States (including three Antici, one Permanent 
Representative and three members of foreign affairs ministries), five representatives of 
DG RELEX (from Head of Unit to Director-General), two of the Commission Secretariat 
(Secretary-General and advisor to Secretary-General), one Vice-President of the 
Commission and that VP’s Deputy Head of Cabinet, and four representatives of the CSG 
(from Principal Advisor to Director-General). These respondents were not only asked 
about the activities of their own institution, but also about those of the remaining 
institutions. The latter allows cross-validating the obtained information, which is 
important given that I enquire about historical facts. 
 
III.2: The EEAS negotiations 
Soon after the formal signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, and under the 
general anticipation of its ratification, the COREPER took up its preparatory work on the 
creation of the European External Action Service (Interview 11; see also above). Still, 
due to the negative outcome of the (first) Irish referendum in June 2008, the process 
was halted until the (then upcoming) Swedish EU Presidency learned in ‘the second half 
of the first half of 2009 when the Irish were planning to have the [second] referendum’ 
(Interview 14). Stockholm then dispatched informal envoys between April and June 
2009 on a tour des capitales to gauge Member States’ opinions on five issues (Interview 
14, 26): i.e., EEAS’ scope (‘What should this thing encompass?’), legal formality (‘Would it 
be an agency, or would it be something else?’), budget (‘How much would it cost?’), staffing 
(‘What it would look like in terms of personnel issues?’)7 and external dimension (‘How we 
                                                        
7  The organigramme was consistently kept out of these negotiations despite demands from MS and EP 
(Interview 2). This was a strategic choice of the Swedish Presidency (Interview 14) as well as, later on, 
of Baroness Ashton (Interview 1; Parliamentary Update, EP Committee of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 
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relate to the 3rd countries.’). After assuming the EU Presidency in July, ambassadorial-
level talks began between the Presidency and the Member States on a ‘one-by-one’ basis 
(ibid.). Formal multilateral negotiations were opened on 4 October 2009 (i.e., one day 
after the ‘Yes’-vote on the second Irish referendum), and took place on a strict issue-by-
issue basis using reports reflecting only the issue at hand: ‘We only surfaced the 
document in its full two weeks before we should have the decision. And that was quite 
important’ (Interview 14). Throughout this period (i.e., July-October 2009), twice-
weekly contacts were established by the Swedish Presidency with leading members of 
the Commission (including Secretary-General Day and the head of President Barroso’s 
private cabinet João Vale de Almeida) and the Council Secretariat-General (headed by 
Deputy Secretary-General Pierre de Boissieu) (Interview 3, 9, 14, 26). The results of 
these discussions were presented on 29 October 2009 as the ‘Swedish Presidency’s 
Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service’.  
 
When the Lisbon Treaty was ratified on 1 December 2009, HR/VP Baroness Ashton 
assumed her official role in the negotiations. While, during the Swedish Presidency, 
suggestions were raised for ‘the creation of a transitional team, which the HR/VP could 
use in setting up the service’ (Interview 2, 11; Swedish Presidency Report §34), Baroness 
Ashton ‘did not trust the existing institutional structures’ (Interview 2, 4) and set up her 
own 13-strong ‘Steering Committee’ – officially established on 28 January 2010 
(Interview 2, 4; EurActiv, 2010). It was comprised of her Head of Cabinet, the 
Secretaries-General and heads of the Legal Services of CSG and EC, the Director-General 
of Commission’s DG RELEX8, the Director of Council’s Directorate E, the Head of EC 
delegations in Third countries, the Director of Council’s Policy Unit, and four 
representatives of the ‘Tri-Presidency’ (i.e., Spain, Belgium and Hungary). Although the 
idea behind the Steering Committee was to ‘establish political lines about the EEAS that 
the HR could put on the table for the Council and the Commission’ by the end of April 2010 
(Interview 3), it collapsed after only a few meetings (Interview 2, 5, 9, 11, 19) and the 
EEAS-negotiations stagnated due to ‘fights between the MS and the European Institutions, 
including the Council’ (Interview 4) and general distrust (identified by a majority of my 
interviewees). The deadlock loosened when, on 26 February 2010, Baroness Ashton 
appointed Poul Skytte Christoffersen and Christian Leffler as Special Advisers on EEAS. 
These appointments provided the necessary impetus to kick-start the negotiations 
(confirmed by almost all interviewees) and the ensuing ‘Blueprint for the EEAS’ received 
political agreement in the Foreign Affairs Council on 26 April 2010.  
 
With this agreement, the framework of the negotiations expanded into quadrilogues due 
to the co-optation of the EP (which has co-decision powers on the staffing and budget of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2010) and her Special Advisers on the EEAS (Interview 2). This is also reflected in the absence of a 
detailed organigramme in official documents up to, and including, the final Formal Agreement of July 
2010 (e.g., Art. 4 and 5 of the Formal Agreement of July 2010; see also EP “Conference of Presidents on 
the External Action Service”, 10 June 2010; Graessle, 2011: “Non-paper on the European External 
Action Service from the Foreign Ministers” of 12 Member States, 8 December 2011). 
8
  A post then filled by João Vale de Almeida, former head of Mr. Barroso’s private cabinet (see above).  
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the new service). A compromise was reached with European Parliament’s negotiators on 
21 June 2010. This agreement was formalised by the Parliament’s Plenary on 8 July 
2010 with 549 votes against 78, with 17 abstentions. 
 
III.3: Evaluating the role of institutions’ internal coordination capacities 
To operationalise the extent of internal coordination capacities within each European 
institution, I follow Farrell and Héritier (2004: 1189) in gauging the degree to which an 
institution allows ‘for a plurality of external relations that are not (…) controlled by one 
internal decision-making process’. To incorporate information on the nature of such 
coordination structures, I take into account whether it is based on a structural, ‘hierarchical’ or 
an informal, ‘lateral’ approach (Bouckaert et al., 2003; Jönsson and Strömvik, 2005; Broman, 
2008). Identifying both elements from a close reading of the relevant literature, one can 
designate internal coordination within both the Commission (EC) and the Council Secretariat-
General (CSG) as extensive, hierarchical and formalised (Metcalfe, 2000; Christiansen and 
Vanhoonacker, 2008; Kassim, 2006, 2010). In the European Parliament, on the other hand, 
‘there is no effective coordinative capacity’ (Farrell and Héritier, 2004: 1206). The various 
parties and standing committees expend a lot of effort ‘to guard [their] particular 
prerogatives’, such that the EP ‘may be characterised as quite decentralized’ (Farrell and 
Héritier, 2004: 1195-1196). Finally, the Member States (MS) represent an intermediate case. 
Although COREPER and the rotating Presidency de jure represent a formal coordination 
framework, both de facto operate based on lateral, ‘informal institutional practices’ (Tallberg, 
2003: 5; Hartlapp, 2011). The Presidency does not head the MS in a hierarchical sense, but 
rather represents a ‘first among equals’ (Tallberg, 2003: 7). As a result, and given the 
temporality of each Presidency, much of a Presidency’s coordinating ability relies on the 
‘personal qualities’ (Tallberg, 2008: 687) and ‘dedication on the part of the political elites of 
the country’ (Kaczynski, 2011: 3). Moreover, as encoded in the Treaties, each Presidency is 
assisted in its tasks by the CSG and relies on the latter’s expert information regarding 
technical and legal issues for achieving feasible compromise proposals (Kerremans and 
Drieskens, 2003; Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Tallberg, 2008; Kaczynski 2011). MS’ 
coordination capacity thus critically relies upon external agents’ actions.9  
 
 Member States 
The COREPER negotiations under the Swedish Presidency (July-October 2009) were 
generally seen as a ‘successful process’ (Interview 3, Interview 1). The Swedes did an 
‘excellent job’ (Interview 4) to generate a credible compromise among the 27 MS on all 
five central EEAS issues characterised. Still, while holding the EU Presidency comes with 
important agenda-shaping powers (Tallberg, 2003, 2008; Warntjen, 2008), this does not 
suffice to explain the Swedish success. The Spanish Presidency – which followed the 
Swedish one – could, in principle, rely on the same institutional framework and agenda-
shaping powers; yet, it did not play an equally decisive role in the EEAS negotiations. A 
                                                        
9  Note that a similar evaluation occurs from applying Metcalfe’s (1994, 2000) 9-point ‘policy 
coordination scale’. The characteristics of the Secretariats-General of Council and Commission imply 
that these institutions can be ranked around position 8 on this scale. The Member States and the EP 
would, at best, be scaled around position 4 or 5. 
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more comprehensive explanation of the Swedish success rather lies in their strategic 
choice of negotiation tactics in terms of agenda-setting (i.e., issue-by-issue and bilateral-
before-multilateral talks), agenda-order and agenda-control (i.e., the timing of the 
negotiations as well as the provision of key documents). The unity this engendered 
among the MS disappeared at the onset of the Spanish Presidency due to their ‘relative 
absence’ (Interview 19) and ‘defensive’ stance (Interview 4). Indeed, Spain’s programme 
for its presidency – generally deemed ‘over-ambitious’ and ‘sadly lacking in detail’ 
(Heywood, 2011: 79) – as well as its limited resources and internal disagreements 
(Interview 24) meant it initially lacked the commitment of the Swedish Presidency with 
respect to the EEAS negotiations (Interview 25). Moreover, Spain’s bad domestic 
economic situation, coupled with the global financial crisis, detracted some of the 
Spanish government’s concentration and interest in the negotiations (Fernández 
Pasarín, 2011). As a consequence, it was perceived to have failed at keeping order in the 
house10 (although this improved in the finishing stages of the negotiations; Interview 1, 
12, 19). 
 
Admittedly, the Spanish Presidency was hampered in two respects. First, during the 
Spanish Presidency, the representatives of the Tri-Presidency in Baroness Ashton’s 
Steering Committee were to take part only ‘on an individual basis and were not to 
represent or speak on behalf of COREPER’ (Rettman, 2010). As a result, MS were 
explicitly prevented from giving the Tri-Presidency representatives a clearly defined 
mandate based on a common position. This, in turn, undermined the informal 
coordination processes that had been maintained successfully during the Swedish 
Presidency because (the belief in) the benefit of such coordination declines when it does 
not generate an enforceable mandate (note that the EP’s principal negotiators faced the 
same problem; see below). Second, the Spanish Presidency was the first one under the 
new institutional architecture installed by the Lisbon Treaty (with a permanent 
president – Herman van Rompuy – and a de facto foreign minister – HR/VP Baroness 
Ashton). This reduced the Spanish Presidency’s political leeway and media visibility 
(Heywood, 2011; Kaczynski, 2011; Interview 25) and introduced considerable 
uncertainty about its powers, which, in turn, increased its reliance on expert legal 
information from the CSG (Interview 25). However, the CSG was at this stage felt to limit 
or obstruct the information flow on the EEAS negotiations to both MS and EP (Interview 
12, 19, 20; Parliamentary Update, EP Committee of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2010). 
Lacking necessary information, MS’ unity dissolved as distrust increased (Interview 4, 9, 
11, 20). 
 
Both handicaps substantiate the crucial role of information and trust in collaborative 
networks and negotiated coordination (Crozier and Friedberg, 1980; Scharpf, 1994; 
Bouckaert et al., 2003; Broman, 2008). They also underline MS’ inability to coordinate 
                                                        
10
  For example, it was Baroness Ashton’s Special Advisers on the EEAS, rather than representatives of the 
Spanish Presidency, that ‘managed to also bang heads’ to align Member States in COREPER meetings at 
this time (Interview 14). 
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without the explicit interest of political elites in the country holding the Presidency as 
well as the (semi)external imposition of the type of negotiation strategies employed by 
the Swedish Presidency. This ‘falling-apart’ of the MS-front corroborates the idea – 
raised in section 2 – that negotiated coordination is sensitive to leadership turnover 
(Chisholm, 1989) and requires continued dedication and commitment of those involved 
(Habeeb, 1988; Kaczynski, 2011). Indeed, although the Spanish Presidency rallied 
during the final stages of negotiations and at the Madrid summit of June 2010 (Interview 
7, 12; EP-Debate ‘Review of the Spanish Presidency’, 6 July 2010), the consequences of 
their initial shortcoming continued to be felt (Kaczynski 2011, Fernández Pasarín, 
2011). Hence, even though informal, lateral coordination is feasible (as under the 
Swedish Presidency), ‘a more formal structure (…) [helps] to overcome the weaknesses 
of informal groups’ (Drahos, 2003: 79). 
 
 European Parliament 
In contrast to the MS, the European Parliament (EP) never managed to overcome its lack 
of internal coordination structures. In effect, intra-EP negotiations on the EEAS were 
based on ‘broad consultation within the Parliament (…) engaging also all [six] 
committees involved in the process of the establishment of the EEAS’ (Brok and 
Verhofstadt, 2010, 1). Finding ‘a common language’ between these various participants 
proved extremely difficult (ibid.).11 Besides being a recurrent theme among my 
interviewees (Interview 4, 7, 18, 22), this division also shows from various 
parliamentary reports on the EEAS (e.g., EP Session Documents A7/0041/2009 from 20 
October 2009 and A7-0228/2010 from 6 July 2010), which consistently include separate 
opinions of all EP’s standing committees involved with EEAS, rather than one unified 
statement. Moreover, the various committees mostly worked in parallel with little 
apparent coordination between them (‘Working Document’ on EEAS, EP Committee on 
Legal Affairs, 20 May 2010). 
 
As a result, even ten days before the final compromise was reached at the Madrid 
Summit (i.e., 21 June 2010), intra-EP discussions turned into a ‘really fundamental 
discussion about the procedural approach’ (Interview 7) and disputes over the exact 
mandate of its principal negotiators (Interview 7, 18). Also, after the European 
Commission and the Spanish Presidency reached a compromise with EP’s negotiators on 
21 June 2010, a significant group of MEPs criticised the agreement – and threatened to 
postpone the necessary plenary vote on EEAS (Interview 18; Quatremer, 2010) – 
because the EP negotiators were alleged to have no clearly-defined mandate to conclude 
an agreement on behalf of the EP (Interview 18). 
 
                                                        
11
  The EP seemed to only agree on the fact that EEAS’ political and financial accountability should be 
guaranteed (Interview 7, 18; Day, 2010; Ashton, 2010). There was ‘surprising unison’ also on the fact that 
recruitment for the EEAS should be based on ‘merit, not any kind of quotas’ (Tannock, 2010). The fact that 
this unanimity is described as ‘surprising’ underscores that agreements within the EP were rare during the 
negotiations. These issues mirrored, however, similar concerns within the Commission (e.g., 1909
th
 meeting 
of Commission, 11 March 2010). 
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This reflects one of the fundamental differences between institutions lacking and those 
possessing internal coordination. In the latter, intra-institutional discussions are 
characterised by top-down information-sharing (Mayer, 1992; Scharpf, 1994). The 
negotiation power itself is, arguably, delegated to – or captured by – their coordination 
units. In the former, intra-institutional discussions are much more concerned with 
finding an agreement, or convincing others of one’s point of view (Mayer, 1992). Within 
the EP, the three main negotiators (i.e., MEPs Brok, Verhofstadt and Gualtieri) ‘had 
different priorities (…) so they needed to make an effort to bring these priorities in line 
with each other’ (Interview 22). The same was true for the six EP committees discussing 
the EEAS (e.g., EP Session Documents A7/0041/2009 from 20 October 2009 and A7-
0228/2010 from 6 July 2010). Moreover, as EP’s negotiators never obtained a clear and 
well-defined mandate, they ‘could do whatever they want to do, but they need to come 
back next day and explain to the Parliament’ (Interview 7).12 As mentioned, a similar 
issue arose between the MS during the Spanish Presidency: i.e., the ‘most difficult task is 
actually the internal coordination’ (Interview 2). This lack of internal unity not only 
weakens one’s stance in inter-institutional negotiations, but also detracts energy from 
inter- to intra-institutional discussions. 
 
 Secretariats-General of Council and Commission 
Turning attention to both institutions with access to hierarchical formalised 
coordination structures – i.e., the Secretariats-General of the Council and the 
Commission – it is clear that both played a very prominent role throughout the EEAS 
negotiations. Commission Secretary-General Catherine Day explicitly defended this 
involvement before the UK House of Lords by referring to the pre-eminent position of 
the Secretariats-General in terms of their institutional and legal knowledge and 
experience (Day, 2010). Interestingly, she offered this explanation as an opening 
statement without being prompted to defend their involvement. This not only suggests 
that she personally felt that this requires defending (rather than being a ‘natural’ course 
of events), but also that the Commission’s Secretariat-General realizes that its 
possession of such knowledge and experience allowed it to create a space for itself at the 
heart of the EEAS negotiations. 
 
One could argue that – even though Ms. Day feels this requires explicit defence – both 
Secretariats-General are institutionally designed to play such a prominent role 
(Hartlapp, 2011). Yet, two elements indicate that strategic decisions were taken by the 
Secretariats-General to strengthen their position in the EEAS negotiations.  
 First, officials working in coordinating bodies such as the Secretariats-General are 
‘trained to be generalists and thus may lack detailed technical knowledge of some 
                                                        
12
  This echoes the rules the EP has set up to approve inter-institutional agreements (IIAs) (Kietz et al., 2005; 
Alemann, 2006). Moreover, it substantiates Costello and Thomson’s (2010, 2011) finding that, while 
Rapporteurs can have substantial influence over EP’s position, their influence in negotiations that fall under 
the codecision procedure is ‘limited to proposals that are fast-tracked through the EP without undergoing the 
full process of plenary amendments’ (Costello and Thomson’s, 2011: 339).  
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issues under negotiation’ (Hamlet, 2005: 27). Hence, their involvement should 
supplement, rather than replace, groups with issue-specific expertise (Hartlapp, 2011). 
Such replacement, however, appears to have been commonplace in the EEAS 
negotiations. For example, Commission’s DG RELEX was not ‘terribly heavily involved in 
the construction of the EEAS’ (Interview 16; also Interviews 1, 7, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22), 
even though a majority of its staff was to be transferred to the new service. In fact, its 
Director-General was appointed head of the EU delegation in Washington in February 
2010,13 while the leader of its internal ‘working group on EEAS’ maintained that ‘I have 
seen a lot of how the thing developed, but I have not always been present at the key 
decision-making moments, I have to make this clear’. Interviewee 21 states that a 
similar feeling existed at affected units in the Council: ‘I think this is a feeling of both 
sides of the Rue de la Loi’. Thus, the strong leadership of Catherine Day, backed by an 
omnipresent president Barroso (e.g., 1909th meeting of Commission, 11 March 2010) 
and the expertise of the Secretariats-General provided the opportunity to act as gate-
keepers and agenda-shapers in the EEAS negotiation process, and side-step the 
autonomous DGs. 
 Second, under the Spanish Presidency, MS’ Permanent Representatives complained 
that they failed to receive notes from meetings and were not kept sufficiently up-to-
date about developments (Interview 12, 19, 20). Such information-provision is, as 
mentioned, a key task of the Council Secretariat-General (CSG), and some felt that it 
had made a ‘conscious decision’ (Interview 19) to reduce the amount of information MS 
received about the EEAS negotiations. The same feeling lived in the EP, which 
complained that it received legislative drafts only with substantial delays 
(Parliamentary Update, EP Committee of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2010; EP 
‘Conference of Presidents on the External Action Service’, 10 June 2010). As up-to-date 
information ‘about the bargaining process(es) at the different levels (…) [and] about 
what is acceptable and unacceptable’ is necessary to undergird ones negotiation 
strategy (Kerremans and Drieskens, 2003: 165), CSG thus appears to have heeded 
Chisholm’s (1989: 32) warning that the ‘information most needed for coordination is 
often potentially damaging to the party who is supposed to supply it’. The ensuing 
comparative information advantage increased CSG’s influence over the negotiations 
and, by having a ‘profound impact on the recipient’s capacities for action’ (Crozier and 
Friedberg, 1980: 42), made it easier to keep control over the agenda. 
 
The influence of both Secretariats-General also surfaced prominently in the process of 
drafting proposals throughout the negotiations. Interviewee 2, for example, explicitly 
affirms that a group of eight people, including representatives of ‘the two legal services 
(…), people from the Secretariat-General of the Commission and from the Secretariat-
General of the Council (…) sat together and drafted the basic decision [i.e., the Blueprint]’, 
while other interviewees confirm the general nature of this pattern throughout the EEAS 
                                                        
13
  This was widely regarded as an explicit attempt by President Barroso to (help) steer decisions on the EEAS 
as well as exert influence on key external relations postings while still under Commission authority 
(Mahony, 2010).  
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negotiations (Interview 1, 11, 12, 14, 19). While the presence of both legal services is 
explained by their position as principal interpreters of EU law, the involvement of the 
Secretariats-General cannot fall back on this interpretation. Nonetheless, as argued 
above, translation of ideas into drafts of legal text generates the ability to obtain 
influence. In the case of the EEAS negotiations, this occurred both by exploiting the 
opaqueness of legal texts for additions or modifications (Interview 8) and arguing that 
there is no legal course of action for certain (undesirable) proposals (Interview 8, 22). 
Once again, therefore, experience with intra-institutional coordination was exploited by 
the Secretariats-General to gain a stronger foothold over the inter-institutional 
dynamics in the EEAS negotiations.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that both Secretariats-General provided a ‘united 
front’ throughout much of the negotiations (Interview 2, 3, 4, 8, 11). Clearly, institutions 
whose staffs are most directly affected by the creation of EEAS (i.e., EC and CSG) have 
most at stake in the negotiations. This might make them ‘natural allies’. Still, this 
argument weakens substantially when one considers the highly asymmetric nature of 
the effects of EEAS – both in terms of staff and competencies affected – on EC and CSG. 
Specifically, CSG loses all its foreign policy competencies and staff to EEAS, whereas EC is 
‘keeping a huge interest in the external relations’ (Interview 6; 1909th meeting of 
Commission, 11 March 2010). As such, the creation of EEAS puts a bigger constraint on 
CSG than EC, weakening the case for an ‘affected-parties-stick-together’ alliance. Also, 
differences in their decision-making dynamics – i.e., inter-governmental (CSG) versus 
supranational (EC) – make that ‘the Commission is the … sort of enemy number one for the 
Council’ (Interview 18; also Interview 2, 8). In fact, a more natural alliance was expected 
between the Commission and the EP (Interview 2, 7, 12, 18, 22; 1909th meeting of 
Commission, 11 March 2010). While the attraction of such alliance is illustrated by the 
fact that the Commission ‘threatened the Council with the EP: If you don’t… Don’t push the 
Commission into the arms of the EP’ (Interview 11), it never materialized. Instead, there 
developed ‘a situation where we can join forces also vis-à-vis the EP. (…) Even though the 
EP probably would have liked to play on the difference between the Commission and the 
Council – that is not happening’ (Interview 2). This lends credence to various 
interviewees’ opinion that the accord between the Secretariats-General constituted part 
of ‘a deal’ between the Commission and the Council (Interview 7, 12, 18). The ability of 
both institutions to engage in such deal-brokering – despite the difference in their 
outlook on foreign policy – suggests that their representatives’ experience with a 
common culture of internal coordination can pave the way for a mutual language and a 
point of understanding (Christiansen, 2001). 
 
 
 
IV: Conclusion 
This paper argued that coordination capacities developed within an institution may not 
only prove beneficial for that institution’s internal management, but can also have 
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important effects on external (i.e., inter-institutional) dynamics. Tracing the negotiation 
process leading to the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) provides 
evidence in line with this argument. The findings are most aptly summarized by 
Interviewee 23, who argues that EEAS is a compromise that came about ‘mostly through 
the coordination functions of the Secretariats-General of the Council and the Commission’. 
Clearly, from a policy perspective, this increases the benefits of investing in the creation 
of such coordination capacity, or, once obtained, in defending it: ‘She [i.e., Baroness 
Ashton] has the responsibility to do all the coordinating and so on, but I’m not sure to what 
extent Commission is willing to allow all this coordination to be done from within the EEAS’ 
(Interview 1). 
 
A number of further questions arise at this point. For one, I concentrated exclusively on 
the negotiation process. Future work should evaluate to what extent the outcome of 
inter-institutional negotiations is similarly affected by involved institutions’ (lack of) 
internal coordination structures (for a recent analysis in this direction, see Costello and 
Thomson, 2011). If so, increases in institutions’ coordination capacities are likely to have 
implications reaching further than currently recognized. Second, several contributions 
in Peters et al. (2000) as well as Bouckaert et al. (2003) and Johansson and Tallberg 
(2010) suggest that a similar concentration of powers at the executive level is likewise 
taking place at the national level. This raises the question whether this article’s findings 
carry over to the national arena and, if not, why such differences might arise. Third, the 
analysis regarded coordination as a mainly positive force. In some cases, however, it 
may well be that ‘lack of coordination or inadequate coordination may be functional (…) 
in ensuring latitude at the bargaining table’ (Peters and Wright, 2004: 173). Finally, 
given the case-study approach employed here, it has not been possible to evaluate how 
the speed of the EEAS reform or the political sensitivity of the foreign policy issue affects 
the role of coordination structures. Such scope conditions are clearly worth more 
research. One route to fruitfully tackle this issue might involve analysing negotiations 
between different international organisations, or looking into the negotiation process of 
the growing number of Inter-Institutional Agreements (IIAs) between EP, Commission 
and Council, both of which cover a wide range of issues. 
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Appendix A: Interviews on EEAS by the British House of Lords 
 
Full transcripts for all interviews listed below are available from 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select 
 
1. British House of Lords’ EU and Foreign Affairs Committee 
Robert Cooper, Director for External and Politico-Military Affairs, European Council. 
Catherine Day, Secretary-General of the European Commission (together with her 
adviser, William Sleath). 
Arnaud Danjean, MEP (France). 
Alain Délétroz, Vice-President (Europe) International Crisis Group. 
Andrew Duff, MEP (UK). 
Christian Leffler, Deputy Director-General, DG Development (Relations with African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States), European Commission. 
David Lidington, MP, Minister for Europe. 
James Kariuki, Head of Europe Global Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  
Angus Lapsley, Counsellor for CFSP, CSDP and Enlargement, UKRep, Brussels. 
Koos Richelle, Director-General, EuropeAid. 
Dr. Charles Tannock, MEP (UK). 
 
 
2. British House of Lords’ Select Committee on the European Union 
Baroness Ashton of Upholland, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
policy, Vice-President of the European Commission.  
HE Carles Casajuana, Spanish Ambassador.  
Beatriz Garcés, Agriculture and Environment Counsellor. 
José Antonio Zamora, Economic Counsellor. 
 
 
